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Abstract
The global portfolio of protected areas is growing rapidly, despite widely recognized
shortfalls in management effectiveness. Pressure to meet area-coverage and manage-
ment effectiveness objectives makes it essential to determine how limited conserva-
tion funds should be allocated between expanding protected area networks and better
enforcing existing reserves. We formally explore this question for the particular case
of an exploited species in a partially protected system, using a general model linking
protection, enforcement and legal/illegal resource extraction. We show that, on aver-
age, funds should be disproportionately invested in enforcement rather than expan-
sion. Further, expansion alone, without additional enforcement, can actually reduce
conservation outcomes. To help guide future decisions, we calculate the optimal allo-
cation of resources between these two actions given any current level of enforcement
and protected area coverage. In most cases, simultaneously investing in expansion and
enforcement is the optimal decision. However, in places with low enforcement and
high protection, protected area contraction, or strategically concentrating enforcement
effort, produces the greatest benefits.
KEYWORD S
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1 INTRODUCTION
International conservation agreements are driving the most
rapid expansion of protected areas (PAs) in history. For exam-
ple, Aichi Target 11 commits signatory countries to enclos-
ing 17% of terrestrial and 10% of marine environments in
“effectively and equitably managed” PAs by 2020 (Conven-
tion on Biological Diversity, 2010). Although many parts of
the world now have substantial proportions of their land and
sea territory under formal protection, over 50% of species
have insufficient protection to meet current conservation tar-
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original
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gets (Butchart et al., 2015), and many PAs lack adequate man-
agement to effectively abate threats (Craigie et al., 2010; Geld-
mann, Joppa, & Burgess, 2014; Gill et al., 2017; Mora, 2006).
While some initiatives are calling for even more of the Earth's
surface to be dedicated to nature (e.g., “half-earth” (Wilson,
2016)), others suggest that shifting efforts towards implemen-
tation and enforcement of existing PAs would better serve
conservation (Costelloe et al., 2015; Jenkins & Joppa, 2009).
While there are alternative approaches to protect biodiversity
and reduce threats (Buscher et al., 2017), strict PAs remain a
cornerstone of modern biodiversity conservation.
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Resource constraints make it difficult to improve both the
effectiveness and coverage of PAs. The dramatic expansion of
terrestrial and marine PAs over the past 25 years (by 92% and
513%, respectively (Butchart et al., 2015)), reflects a substan-
tial investment in PA establishment. A corresponding invest-
ment in management capacity is not as apparent, with many
existing PAs currently lacking the means to operate effec-
tively due to shortfalls in resources and/or management plan-
ning (Gill et al., 2017; Leverington, Costa, Pavese, Lisle, &
Hockings, 2010; Watson, Dudley, Segan, & Hockings, 2014).
Effective PA management is required to stop threats that
undermine the values of parks. Such investment is particu-
larly vital for extractive threats, including fishing (Bergseth,
Russ, & Cinner, 2015; Mora, 2006), bushmeat hunting, and
wildlife trade harvest (Hilborn et al., 2006). In these cases,
a large part of effective management involves ensuring com-
pliance with no-take regulations (Arias, 2015; Keane, Jones,
Edwards-Jones, & Milner-Gulland, 2008). Illegal harvesting
(i.e., poaching) is particularly problematic because poachers
may become more attracted to PAs as they become more
effectively enforced and protected populations increase (Arias
& Sutton 2013; Hall, Milner-Gulland, & Courchamp, 2008).
Additionally, as PAs expand, enforcement resources will be
diluted across larger areas and longer perimeters, potentially
decreasing the optimal number of reserves (Potts & Vincent,
2008). These dynamics create complex feedbacks between
expansion, enforcement, and human behavior that are critical
to understanding compliance and conserving biodiversity.
Ideally, maximizing expansion and enforcement would
produce the best outcomes for conservation, but both actions
are interdependent and demand the same resources. The opti-
mal allocation decision is therefore not obvious. Here, we
develop a general model that describes the coupled dynam-
ics of protection and compliance in a partially protected habi-
tat network, focusing on the case of a commercially valuable
species. We apply this model to (1) evaluate the impact of PA
expansion without additional enforcement funds; (2) deter-
mine how an increasing budget should be shared between
enforcement and protection from a low protection/low
enforcement state to a high protection/high enforcement state;
and (3) guide the allocation of resources between these two
actions given any current level of enforcement and protection.
2 METHODS
Our model describes an exploited metapopulation of both
commercial and conservation value, and the behavior of
humans exploiting these organisms in a partially protected
system (Figure 1). To focus on the trade-off between the
extent of the PA network and the level of enforcement effort,
the ecological and economic components of the model are
straightforward and general. The model was parameterized to
ensure that the harvested metapopulation was robust enough
to persist without any protection, but where both the har-
vesters and population would respond to changes in protec-
tion and enforcement (see Table S1 for a complete table of
model parameter values. Model code is publicly available at
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.1068314).
Population Model: We use a spatially implicit population
model to describe a species with a two-phase life-history: a
space-limited adult stage and a dispersive juvenile stage. This
basic structure resembles many plant, insect, and mammal
species, but is most similar to a fish species in a patchy coastal
habitat (e.g., rocky or coral reefs). Space is represented by M
habitat patches, which could represent sites or home ranges
in a contiguous land- or seascape, or discrete patches in a
metapopulation. The dynamics of individual patches are cou-
pled by juvenile dispersal. The system is divided into R pro-
tected patches, where extractive activities are prohibited by a
uniform level of enforcement (but are not necessarily absent),
and F = M – R unprotected patches, where there are no har-
vest restrictions. Patches are ecologically and economically
identical (e.g., equal travel costs, productivity), but experience
different levels of extractive effort due to the enforcement of
harvest restrictions on protected patches. The model, there-
fore, describes two abundance levels: ?̄?𝑅 on each protected
patch and ?̄?𝐹 on each exploited patch.
Wemodel abundance on the reserved and harvested patches
in discrete time with the equations:
?̄?𝑅(𝑡 + 1) = ?̄?𝑅(𝑡)
(
1 − 𝑞𝐸𝑧
𝑅
)
(1 − 𝑚) + 𝐼(𝑡), (1)
?̄?𝐹 (𝑡 + 1) = ?̄?𝐹 (𝑡)
(
1 − 𝑞𝐸𝑧
𝐹
)
(1 − 𝑚) + 𝐼(𝑡). (2)
The total abundance of the species across the system is
therefore:
𝑁𝑇 (𝑡) = 𝑅?̄?𝑅(𝑡) + (𝑀 − 𝑅)?̄?𝐹 (𝑡). (3)
Abundance declines through natural mortality, 0 ≤ 𝑚 ≤
1, and human extractive effort on protected and unpro-
tected patches: 0 ≤ 𝐸𝑅, 𝐸𝐹 ≤ 1. On each patch, populations
increase by the immigration of new juveniles, 𝐼(𝑡). Harvests
are described by a Cobb-Douglas production function, deter-
mined by the catchability, 0 ≤ 𝑞 ≤ 1, of the species, and a
diminishing returns parameter, 0 < 𝑧 < 1, which reflects the
effort-output elasticity or the fact that doubling effort does not
double the yield.
Together, all patches produce 𝐽 juveniles, proportional to
the species’ per-capita fecundity, 𝑓 :
𝐽 (𝑡) = 𝑓 [𝑅𝑁𝑅(𝑡) + (𝑀 − 𝑅)𝑁𝐹 (𝑡)]. (4)
Juveniles are highly dispersive, and are distributed at an
even density across protected and unprotected patches. We
explore how this assumption affects our results in Text S1.
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F IGURE 1 Schematic of model dynamics for an exploited, space-limited species in a marine context. The model depicts a partially-protected
system (total patches = M). The population (NR) on protected patches (green, R) and legally exploited population (NF) on unprotected patches (blue,
F =M - R) are ecologically and economically identical. Extractive effort on protected patches is affected by the level of enforcement, which determines
the probability of being apprehended, pB, and the penalty incurred when apprehended, cB. Profits on protected and unprotected patches (𝜋𝑅 and
𝜋𝐹 , respectively) are equal to the difference between the market price (d) and the operational and the expected apprehension costs of harvesting
those species. Enforcement level is varied by increasing or decreasing the budget for enforcement, B, which directly impacts the probability of being
apprehended, pB; expansion is simulated by increasing the proportion of patches that are protected (
𝑅
𝑀
), and which are therefore visited by enforcement
officers. Symbols for diagrams courtesy of the Integration and Application Network (ian.umces.edu/symbols)
Upon arrival, juveniles experience density-dependent mor-
tality before entering the adult population according to a
Beverton-Holt relationship:
𝐼(𝑡) =
∝ 𝐽 (𝑡)
𝑀
1 + 𝛽𝐽 (𝑡)
𝑀
. (5)
We assume that 𝛼 = 1 and 𝛽 = 0.01 for all examples below
(but see sensitivity analyses in Text S2).
Economic model: We take an instrumental approach to
compliance (Tyler, 1990), where resource users behave as
rational, profit maximizers. From this perspective, protected
patches carry higher expected extraction costs (as a result of
penalties), but may also have a higher abundance of the target
species. The amount of illegal harvesting occurring on pro-
tected patches reflects this expected cost.
Extractive effort on protected patches is thus affected by
the level of enforcement, which determines the probability
of being apprehended, 0 ≤ 𝑝𝐵 ≤ 1, and the penalty incurred
when apprehended (e.g., fines, equipment confiscation, lost
time), cB. The expected cost of being apprehended while
poaching is therefore 𝑝𝐵𝑐𝐵 . The apprehension probability of
a harvester who spends a unit amount of time poaching is a
function of the enforcement budget, B, minus overheads (e.g.,
travel costs, staff salaries) for each PA, 𝑐𝑇 :
𝑝𝐵 = (𝐵 − 𝑅𝑐𝑇 )∕𝑅. (6)
We bound 𝑝𝐵 between 0 and 1 (Figure S1). Note that
because this probability is per unit time, increased poaching
effort results in a higher expected apprehension cost (Bulte
et al., 1999). Additionally, below a budget threshold that
reflects enforcement overheads, (𝐵 < 𝑐𝑇𝑅), 𝑝𝐵 = 0, pro-
tected patches are essentially paper parks. Since very lit-
tle is known about the relationship between the probability
of apprehension and the amount of enforcement resources
allocated we chose a linear relationship, but a logit func-
tional form may also be appropriate. Profits on protected and
unprotected patches (𝜋𝑅 and 𝜋𝐹 , respectively) are equal
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to the difference between the unit market price of the
resource, d, and the operational, 𝑐𝐸, and expected apprehen-
sion costs, 𝑝𝐵𝑐𝐵, of harvesting:
𝜋𝑅 = 𝑑𝑞𝑁𝑅𝐸𝑧𝑅 − (𝑐𝐸 + 𝑝𝐵𝑐𝐵)𝐸𝑅 (7)
𝜋𝐹 = 𝑑𝑞𝑁𝐹𝐸𝑧𝐹 − 𝑐𝐸𝐸𝐹 . (8)
Here, we assume harvester and enforcer operational costs
are equal (𝑐𝑇 = 𝑐𝐸), but we vary them substantially within our
sensitivity analysis (Text S2). Because access to the harvest-
ing sector is unrestricted, the level of poaching effort on both
protected and unprotected patches will increase until super-
normal profits dissipate (i.e., until 𝜋𝐹 = 𝜋𝑅 = 0).
Prioritizing Expansion or Enforcement: Enforcement level
is varied by increasing or decreasing the enforcement budget,
B; expansion is simulated by increasing the proportion of pro-
tected patches.
We first test the impact of expansion without additional
enforcement resources. We begin with only 5% of patches
protected (𝑅∕𝑀 = 0.05), and an enforcement budget large
enough to stop 95% of poaching (i.e., near perfect compliance:
𝐸𝑃 ∕𝐸𝐹 = 0.05). We then simulate gradual PA expansion (up
to 95% protection), but with no additional enforcement funds,
to assess the impact of spreading a fixed enforcement budget
over an expanding PA network.
Second, we consider the optimal pathway between a low-
protection/low-enforcement state, and a high-protection/high-
enforcement state. That is, how should an increasing bud-
get be shared between enforcement and protection? We start
with 5% protection (𝑅∕𝑀 = 0.05) and an enforcement bud-
get low enough that harvesting effort on protected patches is
95% of harvesting effort on unprotected patches (𝐸𝑃 ∕𝐸𝐹 =
0.95). We then calculate the marginal benefit of directing
an additional unit of funding toward increasing enforcement
or increasing PA extent. The optimal decision will clearly
depend on the relative costs of the two actions. Because we
want to understand the intrinsic effectiveness of expansion
and enforcement, not their relative costs, we standardize their
costs. We calculate the improvement in 𝑁𝑇 that results from
increasing 𝑅∕𝑀 from 5% to 10%. We then search for the
amount of additional enforcement resources, 𝛿𝐵 , that cre-
ates the same improvement. Managers can therefore either
increase protection by 5%, or add another 𝛿𝐵 to the enforce-
ment budget.
Finally, based on the standardized units described above,
we calculate the optimal state-dependent conservation deci-
sion for any current level of protection and enforcement. That
is, for all management states (enforcement budget, B, and
protection, 𝑅∕𝑀), we calculate whether managers should
expand (by 5%), or enforce (by 𝛿𝐵). We allow managers to
reduce the area protected (i.e., reducing R/M by 5%), if doing
so improves 𝑁𝑇 . To assess the robustness of our findings,
we tested the sensitivity of our results under two alternative
model formulations (Text S1) and to parameter variation of
±50% (Text S2).
3 RESULTS
With a fixed enforcement budget, our model predicts that
expansion from a low-protection/high-enforcement state will
initially deliver substantial increases in abundance. In other
words, despite a dilution of enforcement resources, the bene-
fits from increasing PA size outweigh the perverse effects of
increased poaching. If expansion continues, total abundance
is maximized at some mid-point of protection, beyond which
the dilution causes conservation benefits to decline. Abun-
dance eventually declines to the level of an unprotected sys-
tem (Figure 2). At this point, enforcement offers no benefits
because the entire budget is consumed by overheads. Figure 2
is generated from our particular parameterization, but the
qualitative changes in performance–diminishing returns and
an interior maxima beyond which expansion produces worse
outcomes–are common to all parameterizations and two alter-
native model formulations (Figures S2–S5). In some systems
a logit functional form for the probability of being caught, 𝑝𝐵 ,
F IGURE 2 Impacts of protected area expansion on total species
abundance under a fixed enforcement budget. Relative total abundance
is standardized to an unprotected system. At the left-hand of the figure,
the enforcement budget is high enough to stop 95% (
𝐸𝑃
𝐸𝐹
= 0.05) of ille-
gal harvest in a system with 5% of patches protected (
𝑅
𝑀
= 0.05). Mov-
ing to the right along the curve, PA expansion initially increases total
abundance, but delivers diminishing positive marginal returns. Once pro-
tection expands above 20%, these marginal returns become negative, as
enforcement effort becomes too diluted. Beyond 75–80% protection, the
budget is entirely consumed by travel time, and conservation outcomes
are no better than an unprotected system. Replication code for this figure
is publicly available at https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.1068314
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F IGURE 3 Total abundance (unprotected and protected patches) under varying levels of enforcement and protected area extent. Grey line
indicates the optimal decision pathway from a low-enforcement/low-protection state to a high-enforcement/high-protection state. Arrows depict the
state dependent decision between expansion and enforcement, for all levels of enforcement and PA network size. Red arrows indicate combinations
of PA extent and enforcement budget where the optimal choice is actually to contract protected areas; black arrows indicate when expand, enforce or
both produces the greatest conservation benefits
may be more appropriate, which would exhibit similar behav-
ior but would likely shift the point where dilution occurs.
To maximize abundance, the optimal resource allocation
from a low-protection/low-enforcement state prioritizes
enforcement over expansion (grey line, Figure 3). Equal
investment in expansion and enforcement initially produces
optimal improvements, but enforcement quickly becomes the
best use of additional resources, at a ratio of approximately
2:1. Importantly, this preference for enforcement holds
broadly true across our sensitivity analysis. This recommends
that, on average, decision-makers aiming to maximize the
abundance of a given exploited species should always invest
at least as much resources into enforcement as expansion
(Text S2 and Figure S2).
Although enforcement is generally preferred over expan-
sion, at low levels of protection the best option is to expand,
since even low enforcement budgets can effectively exclude
poachers across small areas. Moreover, small PAs are gen-
erally unable to produce larger populations, due to insuffi-
cient self-replenishment (Almany et al., 2009), making them
less attractive to poachers. Interestingly, when PAs are rel-
atively large but the enforcement budget is low, conserva-
tion outcomes are best achieved by contracting the PA net-
work, coupled with either a constant or increased enforcement
budget.
4 DISCUSSION
The pressure to expand PAs to meet international targets (e.g.,
Aichi Target 11) may compromise enforcement efforts, par-
ticularly since area targets are clear and quantifiable while
management effectiveness is difficult to measure. We explore
scenarios where decision-makers aiming to maximize the
abundance of an exploited species have two choices in how
limited funds are spent: continue expanding PAs or increase
enforcement in existing reserves.
Our results demonstrate that PA expansion without
enhanced enforcement will always deliver diminishing
marginal returns for the conservation of an exploited species,
and may even deliver negative returns if it spreads the enforce-
ment effort too thinly. Notably, many PA networks today have
low levels of enforcement–that is, measured compliance is
low–even in relatively well-managed conservation contexts.
For example, the marine reserve network on Australia's Great
Barrier Reef already covers >30% of reef area, but illegal
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harvesting has been estimated at 32.4% of comparable nearby
unprotected reefs (Williamson, Ceccarelli, Evans, Hill, &
Russ, 2014). Similarly, in the 1970–1980′s, 75% of Zambian
elephant populations were lost in the Luangwa Valley
because, despite substantial investments in anti-poaching
patrols, enforcement effort was spread too thinly to stop
poachers (Leader-Williams & Albon 1988; Leader-Williams,
Albon, & Berry, 1990). In such cases, our results suggest
that an expansion of the area under protection will deliver
minimal or even negative conservation returns.
To avoid this, we found that the investment in enforcement
should be at least equal to the investment in expansion, which
may not be the case across many existing PAs. PA estab-
lishment without the means to ensure effective enforcement–
“paper parks”–has been a major criticism of many conserva-
tion initiatives (Di Minin & Toivonen 2015; Dudley & Stolton
1999; Mora, 2006) and insufficient management resources
have been cited across many PA networks (Gill et al., 2017;
Leverington et al., 2010; Watson et al., 2014), which can
limit enforcement efforts. Shortfalls in reporting on man-
agement actions and costs is likely contributing to these
deficiencies. While expansion costs are often readily avail-
able or easy to estimate using proxies for area or opportu-
nity cost (Armsworth, 2014; Naidoo et al., 2006), enforce-
ment budgets are commonly too convoluted to approximate
or include in systematic planning (Armsworth, 2014, Ban &
Klein 2009; but see Davis et al. 2015). Improved transparency
and accounting of management activities is urgently needed to
prioritize actions and maximize biodiversity outcomes under
constrained budgets.
In regions with extensive “paper parks” (i.e., high-
protection/low-enforcement), our results show that PA
contraction will deliver the greatest increase in exploited
species abundance, particularly if resources are not available
to increase enforcement effort. However, political difficulties
in PA establishment often make downgrading, downsizing
and degazettement (PADDD) illogical or unacceptable
options. A politically feasible alternative would be to concen-
trate available enforcement resources into a subset of PAs,
particularly those that would benefit the most from additional
enforcement (e.g., those with high conservation value or high
poaching levels). For example, consider the hypothetical PA
system depicted in Figure 2: if 50% of habitat patches were
protected, there would be an enforcement deficit and the PA
networkwould provide little benefit. If additional enforcement
funds were not available and PADDD was not a viable option,
managers could strategically concentrate enforcement effort
within 40% of protected patches to maximize conservation
outcomes. This could be achieved through any mechanism
that frees up money for increased enforcement in other areas
such as triaging the most important or threatened reserves (as
suggested by Fuller et al. (2010), Game, Bode, McDonald-
Madden, Grantham, & Possingham, (2009), Leader-Williams
& Albon (1988)) or through PA zoning schemes (e.g., strict
no-take vs. multiple use or buffer/extraction zones). Albers
(2010) showed that by strategically tailoring enforcement
(or zoning) based on spatial patterns of de facto protection,
where no patrolling is required, and de facto extraction, where
patrolling does not deter illegal harvest, decision-makers can
maximize the amount of pristine area protected.
It is important to note that the dichotomy between expan-
sion and enforcement only exists within the paradigm of PAs.
Many alternative approaches are available to reduce illegal
extraction and/or conserve biodiversity that do not involve
either enforcement or expansion. Our results therefore do not
contribute to debates about whether spatial management is
appropriate or socially equitable (Buscher et al., 2017; Duffy,
St John, Büscher, & Brockington, 2016). Moreover, we focus
on a single threat to a single commercially valuable species
whereas modern PA design often considers multiple species,
ecological processes or ecosystem services and tackles mul-
tiple threats (Watson et al., 2014). Our article ignores sev-
eral important threats to biodiversity that can be associated
with illegal harvests–the most obvious being habitat loss and
degradation. While illegal extraction is a proximate cause of
biodiversity loss, our results rely on the underlying assump-
tion that habitat is maintained.
To provide a clear and interpretable contrast between
enforcement and expansion, we chose a relatively simple
formulation of a coupled ecological–economic system. Our
extensive sensitivity analysis showed that our results are
robust to changes in model parameterizations (see Text S1
and S2), but several caveats accompany our recommenda-
tions. First, our model is spatially homogeneous–all patches
are of equal size, equal habitat quality, and have equal travel
costs. Accounting for spatial heterogeneity would cause
patches that are further away to be more costly to enforce
and more costly, but perhaps more profitable, to illegally
exploit. This would likely drive increased poaching, which
we expect would increase the investment in enforcement
over expansion. However, heterogeneity in both PA location
and size can impact effectiveness (Geldmann et al., 2015)
and implementation costs (i.e., acquisition and management
(Ban, Adams, Pressey, & Hicks, 2011; Bruner, Gullison,
& Balmford, 2004)) in complex ways, requiring further
investigation. Second, we do not account for “willingness”
to comply or issues of morality (e.g., a normative approach)
that could affect poachers’ behavior (Keane et al., 2008).
Nevertheless, as long as additional enforcement and heavier
penalties decrease illegal harvests, our conclusions will
remain qualitatively robust. Finally, our model couples
detection and apprehension rates and costs. Detection rates
are likely to be higher than apprehension rates due to dif-
ficulties in proving culpability and costs of pursuing legal
action. This would decreases the probability of incurring a
penalty for illegal harvest, which would increase poaching
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and strengthen our results. Enforcement costs, however, may
require discontinuous budget thresholds, such as the purchase
of additional enforcement vehicles, to realize significant
gains in protection probability which we did not account for
in our model. These expenses are expected to significantly
diminish in coming years with the implementation of vessel
monitoring systems and new patrol technologies such as
unmanned aerial vehicles (i.e., drones; Pimm et al., 2015).
The continued decline of biodiversity despite rapid PA
growth calls into question the current focus on PA expansion.
Our results reveal the close, interconnected, relationship
between expansion, enforcement and PA network perfor-
mance. They suggest that, despite difficulties in measuring
and reporting enforcement, expansion must be associated
with commensurate increases in enforcement resources.
Our conclusions strongly underscore the importance of
setting explicit, quantifiable goals for PA effectiveness and
enforcement, in addition to extent.
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